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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE LAW OF NUISANCE THROUGH A 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CAPTIVITY 
George P. Smith, II* & Matthew Saunig** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: COMING TO THE NUISANCE OR 
BECOMING AN ECONOMIC CAPTIVE? 
Ann and Conrad Riedi lived in the same rent-controlled 
apartment in Manhattan for forty years.1  Despite this long-term 
entrenchment, the Riedis and many of their neighbors are being 
forced to move to make way for a new subway construction.2  Due to 
their relatively low income and inability to pay typical Manhattan 
rent because of their age and status as retirees, the Riedis may very 
well be forced to relocate out of the neighborhood and out of a 
borough in which they have lived most of their lives.3  The Riedis 
have, in essence, become ―economic captive[s]‖ for, put simply, their 
economic situation severely limits their choices as to where to 
relocate.4  An economic captive, then, is someone whose housing 
choices are determined detrimentally by his socio-economic status, 
providing him with extremely limited options for places to live.5  
Further, the housing available to an economic captive is often in 
poor repair, in blighted and/or high crime areas, and far from the 
 
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University; LL.D. Indiana University. 
Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law.  I acknowledge the 
research assistance of Brian D. Concklin, Esq., on Section II of this article. 
** B.A., University of Connecticut; J.D., The Catholic University of America School of Law. 
1 Michael M. Grynbaum, Tenants Making Way for Subway Ask: You Want Me to Move 
Where?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2009, at A17, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/ 
nyregion/08mta.html?sq=grynbaum. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at A20. While there are other rent-controlled apartments in various other 
neighborhoods in Manhattan, most of these units are already occupied.  Id.  As a result of this 
move, the Riedis may also have to part ways with their dog, Biscuit, in order to find a suitable 
place for them to live.  Id. at A17. 
4 The Theory of the Economic Captive is unique to Professor George Smith and was first 
posited in 1995.  George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical 
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 706 (1995). 
5 See id. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012501
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person‘s current neighborhood.6 
The classical situation defining the forces of economic captivity is 
illustrated when relocation by a landowner thereby subjects the 
mover directly to a nuisance or a nuisance-like activity.  For 
example, acquisition of real property in an industrial area may 
almost necessarily burden, significantly, the new owner with smog 
or noise, while relocation to an agricultural community may subject 
other homeowners to putrefying odors.7  If the economic captive 
asserts a nuisance claim, the defendant may then raise an 
affirmative defense that the plaintiff came to the nuisance; in other 
words, the defendant and the injurious activity were established 
prior to the plaintiff‘s arrival.8  Whether the plaintiff‘s status should 
be considered a countervailing factor or argument to the defendant‘s 
affirmative defense that the plaintiff actually came to the nuisance 
is the central policy issue which must be resolved: specifically, the 
manner in which society (be it governmental units or private 
entities) deals with these inherent conflicts presented by a 
recognized theory of economic captivity. 
The phenomenon of the economic captive is a reality of modern 
capitalistic society.9  Notwithstanding this reality, the question still 
 
6 See id.; DANIEL R. MANDLKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 4.05, 4.08 (5th ed. 2003). 
7 See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705–06 (Ariz. 1972) 
(finding that a feedlot for cattle was a nuisance to nearby homeowners because of the 
obnoxious odors and flies); Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267–68 (N.D. 
W. Va. 1982) (rejecting defendant steel corporation‘s coming to the nuisance defense against 
claims that defendant created air pollution and discharged toxins into waterways); Wier‘s 
Appeal, 74 Pa. 230 (1873) (granting injunction against the use of gun powder magazine on the 
ground that it would be a nuisance to nearby residents despite the fact that the gun powder 
was necessary for defendant‘s established business); see also Tal S. Grinblat, Offenses to the 
Olfactory Senses and the Law of Nuisance, 21 LEGAL MED. Q. 1 (1997) (discussing the noxious 
effects and putrid smells generated by large scale hog operations—e.g., fatigue, depression, 
nausea, sleep disturbances, etc.—on populations downwind from these economically 
productive hog farms, together with the availability of nuisance law to partially abate these 
type of businesses).  Aesthetics is also of growing concern in environmental nuisance cases.  
See George P. Smith, II, & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach 
to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 54–56 (1991). 
8 Courts across America have held that the fact that a plaintiff came to the nuisance is not 
a per se defense to a nuisance claim; however, many jurisdictions do consider ―coming to the 
nuisance‖ as a factor in determining whether the defendant‘s activity is unreasonable.  See 
discussion infra Part I.B.  Interestingly, by statute, several states have allowed a party 
plaintiff to seek injunctive relief on a theory of anticipatory nuisance and, thus, abate an 
action before it becomes a nuisance. See George P. Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine of 
Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687 (2005).  Two other defenses available, in principle, 
although not allowed often in practice by the courts, are to be found in contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840B, C (1979) 
(discussing contributory negligence and assumption of the risk); FOWLER V. HARPER & 
FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 83 (1956). 
9 See generally Manny Fernandez, Wary of a Wall Streeter at the Helm, N.Y. TIMES, May 
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remains whether a person‘s socioeconomic status can serve as an 
effective counter to the defense that the plaintiff came to the 
nuisance.  An examination into how the law should treat economic 
captives whose presence in a location is inconsistent with a higher 
use for the land will yield the answer to this question.  Examining 
the efficacy of a variety of approaches leads to the conclusion that 
the best approach is through the working of managed growth and 
bonus zoning in tandem in order to achieve some level of harmony 
amongst a range of demographic groups.10  The employment of 
amortization provisions, where the economic captive is allowed to 
remain in his home for a reasonable period of time, is a necessary 
component of this solution.11  Concluding that this approach is the 
most efficacious leads to the determination that one‘s status as an 
economic captive deserves to be included as a factor in the requisite 
balancing under which a nuisance cause of action is tested 
initially.12  However, such a status is not automatically dispositive 
in dealing with a coming to the nuisance defense and must be 
viewed in light of the desired goal of protecting the common good.13  
The fact remains, importantly, that there is a place for the economic 
captive and that individual is not left defenseless in the world of 
nuisance law.  If recognized, the plaintiffs‘ status as an economic 
captive should offset, or at least neutralize, the fact that he came to 
a nuisance and thereby provide him with an avenue for relief. 
This article will begin with an analysis of nuisance law and its 
purpose.  At the heart of a nuisance action is a fact-specific 
balancing of competing interests that this article will organize into 
a general framework for nuisance inquiries.  Furthermore, this 
article will examine the affirmative defense of ―coming to the 
nuisance‖ and what the appropriate application of such a defense 
entails. 
The evolving land use principle that mandates a balance, or ―fair 
 
17, 2009, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/nyregion/ 
17housing.html?scp=1&sq=%27manny%20fernandez%22%20and%20helm&st=cse (noting 
that there are 402,000 people in New York City public housing). 
10 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
11 See discussion infra Part VI.D. 
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979).  The Restatement states that 
―[a]n intentional invasion of another‘s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is 
unreasonable if . . .  the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor‘s conduct.‖  Id. 
13 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 715 (8th ed. 2011) (―[I]t 
is to the benefit of all interest groups that when courts are enforcing common law principles 
they should concentrate on trying to increase the aggregate wealth of society by making the 
principles and case outcomes efficient.‖). Indeed, ―property rights are instrumental to 
achieving economic efficiency.‖ Id. § 3.11. 
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share,‖ of low and moderate income (i.e., affordable) properties in 
any legal zoning plan14 will then be analyzed within the context of 
its effect on recognition of a theory of economic captivity.15 
Subsequently, the economic captive will be introduced through 
description of examples of this economic captivity, ranging from a 
socioeconomically homogenous inner-city enclave to a college 
student with limited resources.  Thereafter, this article will 
examine a variety of approaches for dealing with the relocation of 
economic captives in light of their displacement.  Through this 
evaluation of efficacy, some amalgamation of solutions will yield the 
ideal approach that should be taken toward the economic captive, 
and a determination will be made as to exactly what role the notion 
of economic captivity should play in contemporary nuisance law. 
 
II.  NUISANCE LAW AND COMING TO THE NUISANCE AS A 
VALID DEFENSE 
A.  Ad Hoc Balancing Quantifies Reasonableness in Furtherance of 
the Common Good 
The basic definition of any nuisance is the ―unreasonable 
interference with the . . . use and enjoyment of‖ one‘s real 
property.16  When analyzing whether some action constitutes a 
nuisance, most courts employ a balancing test.17  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts broadly provides that at the heart of the resolution 
of a nuisance action is a balancing of the utility of certain conduct 
with the gravity of its harm.18  In fact, in demonstrating that a 
balance must be struck between a defendant‘s right to reasonably 
use his property and the plaintiff‘s right to enjoy his property, 
Prosser has stated that ―[these] two [rights] are correlative and 
 
14 See discussion infra Part III.  See generally John M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable 
Housing Obligation: The Mount Laurel Matrix, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 365, 370 (2001). 
15 See discussion infra Part IV. 
16 Abdella v. Smith, 149 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Wis. 1967). 
17 Smith, supra note 4, at 689. 
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979).  The Restatement explains that the 
calculation of the gravity of the harm employs an examination of the following: 
(a) The extent of the harm involved; (b) the character of the harm involved; (c) the social 
value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded; (d) the suitability of 
the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality; and (e) the 
burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm. 
Id. § 827.  Further, the utility of the good considers ―(a) the social value that the law attaches 
to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the 
locality; and (c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.‖  Id. § 828. 
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interdependent, and neither is entitled to prevail entirely, at the 
expense of the other.‖19  This balancing of a defendant‘s rights and 
the utility of the action with a plaintiff‘s rights and the harm 
caused, serves as a judicial tool by which a court can establish 
whether one‘s conduct was unreasonable, in which case a nuisance 
would be found.20  The results of this balancing test are not uniform 
irrespective of locality.21  Rather, what may be reasonable in one 
area could be unreasonable in another.22 
A nuisance can be either private or public.23  A private nuisance 
occurs when one individual violates the maxim, sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas,24 and uses their land so as to injure another 
individual or small group of individuals—the legal equivalent of 
 
19 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 616 (3d ed. 1964).  In 
emphasizing the importance of a balancing test in nuisance actions, Prosser has stated: 
The defendant‘s privilege of making a reasonable use of his own property for his own 
benefit and conducting his affairs in his own way is no less important than the plaintiff‘s 
right to use and enjoy his premises.  The two are correlative and interdependent, and 
neither is entitled to prevail entirely, at the expense of the other.  Some balance must be 
struck between the two.  The plaintiff must be expected to endure some inconvenience 
rather than curtail the defendant‘s freedom of action, and the defendant must so use his 
own property that he causes no unreasonable harm to the plaintiff.  The law of private 
nuisance is very largely a series of adjustments to limit the reciprocal rights and 
privileges of both.  In every case the court must make a comparative evaluation of the 
conflicting interests according to objective legal standards, and the gravity of the harm 
to the plaintiff must be weighed against the utility of the defendant‘s conduct. 
Id. at 616–17 (citations omitted). 
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. c (1979) (―The question is not whether the 
plaintiff or the defendant would regard the invasion as unreasonable, but whether reasonable 
persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider 
it unreasonable.‖); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1320 (2001) (―To classify a [use] 
as a nuisance . . . invoke[s] a regime of reasonable accommodation between conflicting uses.‖). 
21 See Smith, supra note 4, at 701; see also WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 170–71 (photo reprint 1982) (1954) (―There has been general recognition in 
the nuisance cases that the relation of the activity to its surroundings is the controlling 
factor.‖). 
22 Smith, supra note 4, at 701; see also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND 
GRAY ON TORTS  97 (3d ed. 2006) (―It is the type of interest invaded that gives to the tort what 
little unity or coherence it may have.‖).  Common law jurisdictions choosing neither to accept 
nor to follow the Restatement of Torts balancing test factors, have been faulted for 
―balanc[ing] the competing interests as they see fit, considering only the ‗needs of justice‘ 
broadly defined.‖  Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in The Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 485, 525 (2010) (citing 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 78 (2008)).  Neither definitive rules nor 
normative principles exist which can clearly guide courts in determining those interests as 
appropriate to evaluate when balancing actually occurs.  Id. at 525. See also MANDLKER, 
supra note 6, § 4.12. 
23 WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 60 (2d ed. 1956) (stating that 
these two designations ―deserve[] separate consideration‖ from each other based on public 
nuisance‘s protection of the general welfare and private nuisance‘s more individualistic 
scope). 
24 PROSSER, supra note 19, at 616 n.55 (―[U]se thine own so that thou dost no harm to 
another.‖ (citation omitted)). 
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unreasonableness.25  In contrast, a public nuisance occurs when 
there has been an unreasonable interference with a group of 
citizen‘s rights as a community.26  Often the difference is a matter of 
degree and depends upon the number of individuals affected by the 
nuisance.27 
The utility of a nuisance cause of action is that it helps to 
reinforce and preserve the common good through a codification of 
what conduct a society deems to be a reasonable use of real property 
in relation to the rights of others.28  The common good can be 
described as achieving a social benefit that is greater than any 
individual citizen‘s personal concerns.29  Stated otherwise, the 
common good is the achievement of the greatest good for the 
greatest number.30  It is through a balancing test that the courts 
determine which use of property furthers the common good or, in 
other words, which use is more reasonable.31 
 
25 Smith, supra note 4, at 698–99.  See Matthew Saunig, Rebranding Public Nuisance: City 
of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. as a Failed Response to Economic Crisis, 
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 911 passim (2010) (analyzing the proper limits of public nuisance claims 
and cautioning against unfettered expansions of the tort). 
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).  Public nuisance has been called ―a 
species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the 
community at large.‖  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984). 
27 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705–06 (Ariz. 1972). 
28 Smith, supra note 4, at 699 (―[B]y its reasonable application, [nuisance] has sought to 
effect a responsible, balanced approach to property use; an approach which seeks to 
accommodate fundamental principles of utilitarianism with a functional recognition of 
absolute property ownership—all guided as such by a standard of reasonableness effected by 
application of a balancing test.‖). 
29 Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special 
Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 874–75 (2001) (noting that a community‘s values play an 
important role in the calculus of the common good of that locale). 
30 See John C. Duncan, Jr.,  Multicultural Participation in the Public Hearing Process: 
Some Theoretical, Pragmatical, and Analeptical Considerations, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169, 
216 n.216 (1999) (explaining that the common good draws its foundation from utilitarianism).  
Utilitarianism ―focuses less directly on aggregation of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ and more on attainment 
of greater societal ‗happiness,‘ exempt from societal ‗pain.‘‖  Id.  According to the Supreme 
Court, however, there may be very few limits on the common good as seemingly just about 
anything goes with respect to the public purpose requirement for a Fifth Amendment takings 
case.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (finding that economic 
redevelopment constituted a valid public purpose and was sufficient justification for the 
taking of property).  However, in practice, the expanded definition of public purpose to include 
economic redevelopment is not guaranteed to be successful.  See Eric Gershon, Pfizer to Close 
New London Headquarters, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 9, 2009, 
http://courant.com/business/hc-pfizer11100nov10,0766810.story (reporting that the Pfizer 
plant, which was the focus of New London‘s redevelopment plan, was closing down and 
relocating to another part of Connecticut). 
31 Smith, supra note 4, at 680.  See also DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NUISANCE LAW 17 (1992) (―Economic analysis [not only 
seeks to] determin[e] which allocation of scarce resources maximizes wealth [but] is generally 
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Examining the common good through the lens of economics seems 
to be an almost inescapable enterprise.32  The alternative is to place 
social justice, manifested in a fair share approach to legal solutions, 
as the main consideration for defining the common good.33  Yet, 
economics and social justice are not necessarily two different and 
distinct notions.34  The same efficiency that is a desired goal of an 
economic approach also embodies elements of social justice.35  
Engaging in such an ―economic analysis of the law‖ serves to 
reinforce the common good through an attempt to maximize 
society‘s aggregate wealth.36  It is clear then, that economics is 
inevitably at the fulcrum of any balancing test that the courts must 
employ when analyzing the merit of a nuisance claim.  It follows 
that the desired goal in resolving any nuisance claim is to permit 
that use which will best help to maximize the common good37 or 
economic viability. 
B.  Coming to the Nuisance: From Absolute Bar to But a Factor 
1.  Recognition of the Coming to the Nuisance Defense 
Early common law, dating back to the Nineteenth Century, 
recognized ―coming to the nuisance‖ as a valid defense to a nuisance 
claim.38  The concept stemmed from the ancient maxim volenti non 
fit injuiria, meaning ―no legal wrong is done to him who consents.‖39  
In a ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense, in which timing is the key, an 
 
concerned with efficiency, not fairness.‖). 
32 See generally POSNER, supra note 13, at 3–16 (explaining the role of economic 
reasoning—especially rational choice and utility—as an undercurrent of legal decision-
making). 
33 See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 732 
(N.J. 1975).  (―We have earlier stated that a developing municipality‘s obligation to afford the 
opportunity for decent and adequate low and moderate income housing extends at least to ‗. . . 
the municipality‘s fair share of the present and prospective regional need[s].‘‖). 
34 POSNER, supra note 13, at 26–27 (addressing criticisms of the economic approach to law 
and explaining that economics inherently reinforces justice through its attempt to avoid 
waste). 
35 Id. at 35 (―Even the principle of unjust enrichment can be derived from the concept of 
efficiency.‖). 
36 Id. at 713–16.  Such an approach is necessary in the absence of a world in which the 
courts could effectively redistribute wealth throughout society to achieve the greatest level of 
equity.  Id.  Posner states that the legislature is far better equipped at redistributing wealth 
through income taxes and government programs than its judicial counterpart.  Id. at 715. 
37 See discussion supra notes 23–31. 
38 See, e.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1952) 
(citing Rex v. Cross, 172 Eng. Rep. 219 (1826)); Wier‘s Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 241 (1873); see 
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 8. 
39 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 556. 
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established resident who has been carrying on the complained of 
activity for some time seeks favorable treatment over a new 
inhabitant.40  It also entails a presumption that the plaintiff 
understood and accepted the conditions of the area.  For this reason, 
―coming to the nuisance‖ could be likened to the defense of 
assumption of the risk.41  An early case often cited as recognizing 
―coming to nuisance‖ as an affirmative defense to a nuisance claim 
is Rex v. Cross.42  In that case, an English court held that: 
[i]f a certain noxious trade is already established in a place 
remote from habitations and public roads, and persons 
afterwards come and build houses within the reach of its 
noxious effects; or if a public road be made so near to it that 
the carrying on of the trade becomes a nuisance to the 
persons using the road; in those cases the party would be 
entitled to continue his trade, because his trade was legal 
before the erection of the houses in the one case, and the 
making of the road in the other.43 
As that court‘s holding illustrates, early common law favored 
established inhabitants based upon the principle that the plaintiff 
consented to the conduct by moving into the area wherein the 
complained of activity was already taking place.44 
2.  Repudiation of Coming to the Nuisance as a Per Se Defense 
In response to the growth of industrialization and the shift 
towards urbanization during the Nineteenth Century, courts began 
refusing to recognize ―coming to the nuisance‖ as a per se defense in 
nuisance actions.45  Many courts found that the concept of ―coming 
to the nuisance‖ was contrary to public policy and the common 
good.46  Allowing such a defense, it was found, allowed a property 
owner to control the use of the surrounding areas not within his 
 
40 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 426 (2011). 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 556 (citing Rex v. Cross, 172 Eng. Rep. 
219 (1826)).  
43 Rex v. Cross, 172 Eng. 219, 219 (1826). 
44 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 556. 
45 See Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (―The 
majority view [of jurisdictions] rejects the doctrine of coming to the nuisance as an absolute 
defense.‖ (quoting Lawrence v. E. Airlines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955))). 
46 See id.; United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 387 (D. Del. 1905) (stating that recognizing 
coming to the nuisance as a defense ―would be so unreasonable and oppressive as to work its 
own condemnation‖). 
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ownership.47  Additionally, courts were facing plaintiffs with limited 
housing options, such as persons moving into overcrowded cities 
bustling with industrial work.48  Consequently, courts began 
protecting citizens and their dwellings over established businesses. 
An example of this shift is the 1873 case heard before the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Wier’s Appeal, in which several 
residents in a growing borough outside of Pittsburgh brought a 
private nuisance action seeking an injunction to prevent Wier from 
building and maintaining a gun powder storage building on his 
property.49  In upholding the injunction, the court stated ―[c]arrying 
on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place remote from 
buildings and public roads, does not entitle the owner to continue it 
in the same place after houses have been built and roads laid out in 
the neighborhood.‖50  Further clarifying the court‘s response to 
societal changes, the court continued, ―[a]s the city extends, such 
nuisances should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the 
immediate neighborhood of the residences of the citizens.  This, 
public policy, as well as the health and comfort of the population of 
the city, demand.‖51  As the Wier case illustrates, the expansion of 
cities and industrialization helped spur a shift in the minds of 
judges that lead to protecting private dwellings, even at the cost of 
established businesses.52  Although courts began refusing to 
recognize coming to the nuisance as a per se defense, not all 
completely ignored the timing of events, nor do they today.53 
 
 
47 Luce, 141 F. at 389.  See Smith, supra note 4, at 704–05, for analysis of an action for 
anticipatory nuisance; MANDLKER, supra note 6, § 4.03.  
48 Patrick, 549 F. Supp. at 1267. 
49 Wier‘s Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 231 (1873). 
50 Id. at 241. 
51 Id. 
52 See id.; Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549, 550 (Mich. 1948) (granting an injunction 
against operator of dog breeding and boarding business due to odors and flies despite the fact 
that the plaintiffs moved into the area after the creation of the business); Carter v. Lake City 
Baseball Club, Inc., 62 S.E.2d 470, 471, 478 (S.C. 1950) (enjoining the use of school baseball 
field by professional team because it caused a nuisance to nearby homeowners and noting 
that it is no defense that the plaintiff voluntarily moved into the vicinity); Lawrence v. E. 
Airlines, Inc. 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955) (stating in nuisance action against airline 
company that ―it is no defense to an action of this character that the plaintiff ‗came to the 
nuisance‘‖). 
53 See, e.g., Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 129 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1942) 
(dismissing action for injunction against concrete plant because defendant‘s business was well 
established, the plaintiff knew the conditions of the property he purchased, and because the 
defendant‘s business was an integral part of the community); see also Ferdinand S. Tinio, 
Annotation, “Coming to Nuisance” as a Defense or Estoppel, 42 A.L.R.3d 344 (1972). 
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3.  Current Stance: Coming to the Nuisance as a Factor in 
Determining Reasonableness 
As observed, at the heart of any nuisance action is reasonableness 
and currently, although it is not a per se defense, most jurisdictions 
do consider whether a plaintiff came to the nuisance as a factor in 
the ultimate determination of reasonable use.54  When taking into 
account ―coming to the nuisance,‖ it must first be established that 
the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions 
of the area before acquiring the property.55  A plaintiff can have 
constructive knowledge if he knew ―‗information [that] would lead a 
prudent man to believe that the fact existed, and that if followed by 
inquiry must bring knowledge of the fact home to him.‘‖56  Without 
the requisite knowledge, it cannot be said that a plaintiff 
voluntarily came to the nuisance.  Although such a plaintiff or 
economic captive may have knowledge of the surrounding property, 
thus allowing a court to consider ―coming to the nuisance‖ as a 
factor, other considerations may weigh in favor of the economic 
captive.57 
When considering coming to the nuisance as a factor in 
determining reasonableness, several sub-factors can also affect the 
weight of the coming to the nuisance defense.58  The first 
consideration is often the general use of the location wherein the 
nuisance-like activity is taking place.59  It is critical whether the 
 
54 See, e.g., Ensign, 34 N.W.2d at 553; Abdella v. Smith, 149 N.W.2d 537 (Wis. 1967) (―A 
plaintiff, of course, is not ipso facto barred from relief in the courts merely because of ‗coming 
to the nuisance,‘ but it is a factor.‖); Tinio, supra note 53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
840D (1979). 
55 See, e.g., Powell, 129 P.2d at 537–38 (denying injunction against cement business in part 
because the plaintiff knew of the conditions caused by the plant); Mark v. Oregon, 84 P.3d 
155, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that coming to the nuisance is only a consideration if the 
plaintiff knew or should have known of the complained of activity before moving onto the 
property). 
56 Mark, 84 P.3d at 163 (quoting Tucker v. Constable, 19 P. 13 (Or. 1888)).  In affirming an 
injunction preventing the use of a nude beach, the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Mark v. 
Oregon refused to consider the fact that the plaintiffs came to the nuisance as a factor 
because the defendant could not establish that the plaintiffs knew or should have know that 
the nude beach was next to their property.  Mark, 84 P.3d at 157, 163.  This was because the 
plaintiffs only visited the area during the winter months when no sunbathers were present, 
no maps or signs in the area indicated that it was a nude beach, and the seller never 
indicated that the adjacent property was a nude beach.  See id. at 158. 
57 See Spur Indus., Inc., v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972). 
58 Id.; see Tinio, supra note 53. 
59 See, e.g., Powell, 129 P.2d at 537 (noting that at least half of the residents of the town 
depended upon the defendant‘s cement business, whose location was necessary because of its 
proximity to a limestone deposit); see also E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246 
P.2d 554, 563–64 (Or. 1952) (holding private party could not obtain damages based on 
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plaintiff is complaining of conditions typical of industrial activities 
in a well-established industrial neighborhood60 or agricultural 
regularities in a farming region.61  A plaintiff will have a more 
difficult time overcoming the ―coming to the nuisance‖ factor if, for 
instance, the area is zoned for uses other than personal dwellings.62  
This is because courts have favored ―industrial operators who are a 
part of a long-established and recognized industrial center, wherein 
the area is dominated by manufacturing enterprises.‖63  Therefore, 
an economic captive has a stronger case if the area in which he lives 
has some dwellings and is not used exclusively for industry or 
agriculture. 
Another sub-factor vital to a court‘s consideration of a coming to 
the nuisance defense is public policy, which in many instances will 
weigh heavily in favor of an economic captive.64  As one court has 
stated, ―[t]he law recognizes that the nuisance claims of private 
owners must at times yield to public interest and convenience[,]‖ 
while at other times an established business must yield to the needs 
of the public.65  For instance, an established business may need to 
move or cease operations if a city extends and houses are built in 
the area.66  Alternatively, public policy may favor a long standing 
business because of its role to the community.67  Such was the 
finding in Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, where the Supreme 
Court of Washington refused to grant damages to a homeowner 
despite smoke, gas, and noise because roughly half of the town‘s 
livelihood was tied to the cement plant.68  To an economic captive, 
public policy could be a significant consideration against a ―coming 
 
nuisance, in part because the area in which the plaintiff purchased the land was a well-
established industrial district); Abdella, 149 N.W.2d at 541 (stating that one reason the 
defendant‘s use of his property as a horse riding academy was reasonable was because it was 
in a rural area). 
60 See E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 563. 
61 See Abdella, 149 N.W.2d at 541. 
62 See Weir‘s Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 238–39 (1873). 
63 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 560. 
64 Cf. Wier’s Appeal, 74 Pa. at 230; Yaffe v. City of Fort Smith, 10 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Ark. 
1928); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 702 (Ariz. 1972). 
65 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 562. 
66 Wier’s Appeal, 74 Pa. at 236, 237. 
67 Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 129 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1942). 
68 Id. at 537.  More contemporaneous with the decision in Powell is the landmark case of 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).  In Boomer, although the New 
York Court of Appeals found that dust, smoke, and vibration emanating from a cement plant 
constituted a continuing and recurrent nuisance, no injunctive relief was ordered to be given 
to the plaintiffs; rather, permanent damages were assessed.  Id. at 871, 875.  The court 
reasoned that significant economic consequences would result to the local and state economies 
if it issued a prohibiting injunction.  Id. at 871. 
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to the nuisance‖ defense.69  Although an economic captive has 
limited housing options, he should have the same rights as others to 
enjoy his property.70  For instance, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia noted in a 1982 case that the 
defense of ―coming to the nuisance‖ was ―‗out of place in modern 
society where people often have no real choices as to whether or not 
they will reside in an area adulterated by air pollution.‘‖71  For this 
reason, public policy dictates that limited options and financial 
hardship should not require a homeowner to endure unreasonable 
living conditions. 
Factors other than public policy and location can also play a role 
in a court‘s consideration of the fact that a plaintiff came to the 
nuisance.  These include whether the complained of activity has 
increased or changed.72  Although a plaintiff may knowingly move 
into the vicinity of a nuisance, that plaintiff should not have to 
suffer the consequences of increased noise, pollution, or other 
nuisance like conditions.73  An additional factor often analyzed by 
courts when considering ―coming to the nuisance,‖ is the price the 
plaintiff paid for the property.74  If a plaintiff is able to purchase the 
property at a much lower rate, knowing the price was cheaper 
because of the complained activity, a court is more likely to place 
greater weight on a ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense.75  However, 
an economic captive is not comparable to a business that can choose 
to purchase cheap property in an effort to obtain maximum profits.76  
An economic captive, by definition, has few choices, and as such 
should not be penalized for selecting property because of its price.77  
Because most courts are currently considering ―coming to the 
nuisance‖ as a factor in determining reasonableness, an economic 
captive should raise these other factors, in addition to public policy 
 
69 Cf. Powell, 129 P.2d at 538–39. 
70 See Smith, supra note 4, at 706. 
71 Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (quoting 
Lawrence v. E. Airlines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955)). 
72 See, e.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 554, 563–64 (Or. 
1952) (noting that the ―coming to the nuisance‖ doctrine did apply, in part, because the 
complained of activity was not increased beyond what should have been anticipated). 
73 See id. at 564. 
74 See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (noting 
that it was not unfair to require the plaintiff to indemnify the defendant because the plaintiff 
was able to purchase cheaper and larger tracts of land).  See also Rohan Pitchford & 
Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete 
Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 491, 492 (2003). 
75 See Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 708. 
76 See id. at 704. 
77 See Smith, supra note 4, at 706. 
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concerns, the nature of the area, and the plaintiff‘s knowledge of the 
conditions.  It is only after addressing all factors that a court can 
truly determine reasonableness. 
III.  THE SPUR INDUSTRIES APPROACH TO COMING TO THE 
NUISANCE: EMPLOYMENT OF THE COMPENSATED INJUNCTION 
In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., Spur Industries 
owned a cattle farm in an area of Arizona in which farming had 
begun in roughly 1911.78  Spur‘s cattle farm was started in 1956 and 
by 1959 Spur had erected feedlots for approximately 7,500 cattle.79  
In 1960, Del Webb began advertising a housing development that he 
was building, roughly two and one-half miles north of the Spur 
feedlot area.80  At the time of this marketing of the Del Webb 
property, Del Webb did not consider the Spur feedlot area‘s odors to 
be a problem and, in fact, continued to develop further and further 
south, getting closer and closer to the Spur property.81  However, as 
Del Webb expansion continued pushing south, there became a 
significant sales resistance that made it nearly impossible to sell 
the proposed housing lots.82  Del Webb then sued Spur Industries 
asserting that the operation of Spur‘s feedlots constituted a public 
nuisance because it rendered portions of Del Webb‘s property unfit 
for development, thereby making it impossible to sell any 
residential units.83  In addition to their inability to sell residential 
units, Del Webb‘s public nuisance allegation was bolstered by the 
complaints of residents who had already purchased homes from the 
developer about various odorous emissions and secondary effects 
emanating from Spur‘s feedlot.84 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court of Arizona found that 
despite the fact that the operation was a lawful business, Spur‘s 
 
78 Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 703–04. 
79 Id. at 704. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 705.  Del Webb‘s complaint cited ―the flies and the odor which were drifting or 
being blown by the prevailing south to north wind over the southern portion of Sun City‖ as 
the alleged nuisance-like activity that the continued operation of Spur‘s feedlot was causing.  
Id. at 705.  The Supreme Court of Arizona found,  
[t]here [was] no doubt that some of the citizens of Sun City were unable to enjoy the 
outdoor living which Del Webb had advertised and that Del Webb was faced with sales 
resistance from prospective purchasers as well as strong and persistent complaints from 
the people who had purchased homes in that area. 
Id. 
84 Id.  
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continued operation of its feedlots was indeed a public nuisance to 
the already established residents of the nearby community.85  So far 
as the court was concerned, there was no doubt that the residents 
did have an actionable claim to abate Spur‘s business operations 
with respect to the feedlot in question.86  This was because the odors 
and flies caused by the feedlots prevented the residents from 
lawfully enjoying the use of their property.87 
The inquiry then turned to the validity of Del Webb‘s nuisance 
claim arising from the loss of sales and Spur Industries‘ defense 
that Del Webb came to the nuisance.88  The court expressed that 
Spur‘s coming to the nuisance defense to Del Webb‘s nuisance claim 
was not falling on deaf ears when it noted that ―[i]n addition to 
protecting the public interest, however, courts of equity are 
concerned with protecting the operator of a lawfully, albeit noxious, 
business from the result of a knowing and willful encroachment by 
others near his business.‖89  Had Del Webb been the only injured 
party, the court stated that it would ―feel justified‖ in ruling that 
Spur Industries had an adequate coming to the nuisance defense, a 
factor that would have ultimately resulted in a finding that Spur‘s 
use was reasonable.90  The court, however, acknowledged the 
important role that changing circumstances played in the case at 
bar.91  More specifically, the court noted that a lawful business in a 
remote location may become surrounded by a growing population, in 
which case the ―elastic‖ nature of nuisance law a court must 
determine what is fair and reasonable for the interests of the 
public.92  Citing the needs of the general public which was 
increasingly populating the expanding city, the court granted the 
injunction requiring Spur Industries to move its feedlot.93 
This injunction, however, did not relieve Del Webb of any 
 
85 Id. at 706. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 705. 
88 Id. at 706–07. 
89 Id. at 706. 
90 Id. at 706–07. 
91 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the Rule of Law: Teaching Regulatory 
Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 724 (2002) (noting that changing 
circumstances may transform a once reasonable land use into a nuisance).  The court 
explained that Spur had ―no indication . . . that a new city would spring up, full-blown, 
alongside the feeding operation and that the developer of that city would ask the court to 
order Spur to move because of the new city.‖  Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 707–08. 
92 Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 707 (quoting Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104 N.E. 
371, 373 (Mass. 1914)). 
93 Spur Indus., Inc., at 708 (recognizing that the injunction was being granted through no 
fault of Spur‘s). 
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responsibility to Spur Industries.94  According to the court it did 
―not equitably or legally follow . . . that Webb, being entitled to the 
injunction, is then free of any liability to Spur if Webb has in fact 
been the cause of the damage Spur has sustained.‖95  The court 
noted that Del Webb voluntarily purchased land that was remote 
from current urban establishments, primarily used for agriculture, 
and was not protected by urban zoning.96  Moreover, the court found 
that the feedlots were a foreseeable nuisance for the lots Del Webb 
was trying to sell.97  Noting principles of equity at play in the case, 
the Supreme Court of Arizona required Del Webb to compensate 
Spur for their forced move of the feedlot.98  The court stated,  
[i]t does not seem harsh to require a developer, who has 
taken advantage of the lesser land values in a rural area as 
well as the availability of large tracts of land on which to 
build and develop . . . to indemnify those who are forced to 
leave as a result.99 
Thus the court found against Spur Industries while also requiring 
Del Webb to indemnify Spur Industries for the damages sustained 
in relocating the feedlot.100 
The court‘s granting of this compensated injunction reflects the 
current trend that coming to the nuisance, while a factor to 
consider, is not an absolute bar to a nuisance claim.101  As the court 
stated, its decision was ―not because of any wrongdoing on the part 
of Spur, but because of a proper and legitimate regard of the courts 
for the rights and interests of the public,‖ which outweighed Spur 
Industries‘ interests because of the encroaching growing 
population.102  The compensated injunction employed in Spur 
Industries, Inc. is a viable tool in the judicial arsenal especially 
when, as the Arizona Supreme Court made clear, both the general 
public and the offending landowner are innocent but the offending 
use clearly constitutes a nuisance.103 
 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Of Time and Feedlots: The Effect of Spur Industries on 
Nuisance Law, 41 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 75, 88–89 (1992).  Such a trend is 
particularly efficacious ―if a plaintiff is part of a natural wave of growth and development that 
has gradually approached a defendant‘s formerly harmless use.‖  Id. (citations omitted). 
102 Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 708. 
103 Reynolds, supra note 101, at 99.  However, the compensated injunction has been 
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IV.  MOUNT LAUREL AND THE FAIR SHARE PRINCIPLE: A 
SEPARATE, YET RELATED, CONSIDERATION 
In 1975 in South Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount 
Laurel (Mount Laurel I), the Supreme Court of New Jersey was 
faced with the question of whether a developing municipality could 
enact zoning regulations, which made it extremely difficult for low 
and moderate income residents to reside in the town.104  In response 
to an increasing suburbanization sweeping across southern New 
Jersey, the town enacted a zoning ordinance that gave more than 
enough space for potential industry and business development while 
severely limiting the potential for residential development.105  For 
those zones in which residential development was allowed to occur, 
the ordinance was clearly geared towards upper and middle income 
prospective residents by permitting only single-family homes 
situated on large lots.106  In striking down Mount Laurel‘s zoning 
ordinance as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
explicitly adopted the provision that a municipality must ―make 
realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing‖ 
including low and moderate income housing.107  The court focused 
on each municipality‘s greater regional responsibility, to permit 
housing for a ―fair share‖ of the region‘s need for housing for the 
various demographics.108  Other jurisdictions have also 
acknowledged the fair share principle with respect to a 
municipality‘s duty to afford a reasonable opportunity for a 
reasonable number of low and moderate income people to reside in 
that area.109 
 
applied sparingly.  See Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning 
Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
147, 184, n.194 (2002) (commenting that it is highly unlikely for a court to employ a 
compensated injunction). 
104 S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975). 
[hereinafter Mount Laurel I]. 
105 Id. at 718–19.  The court explained that ―much more land has been so zoned than the 
reasonable potential for industrial movement or expansion warrants‖ and that this land 
cannot be used for residential purposes according to the ordinance.  Id. at 719. 
106 Id. at 721. 
107 Id. at 724 (holding that there must be some affirmative effort on the part of the 
municipality to provide for housing opportunities to a variety of socioeconomic groups). 
108 See id. at 726–27.  In noting the need for better regional development, it was explained 
that ―‗effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to depend upon the 
adventitious location of municipal boundaries‘‖ and the modern trend of greater 
suburbanization ―‗refuses to be governed by such artificial lines.‘‖  Id. (quoting Duffcon 
Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 1949)). 
109 See, e.g., BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Millcreek Twp., 633 A.2d 144, 146 (Pa. 
1993). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also held that ―[w]here a municipal 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed one significant 
concern with the fair share doctrine: the extent to which such a 
requirement of a municipality restricts that municipality‘s ability to 
provide quality government services and foster economic growth.110  
Providing a reasonable opportunity for affordable housing for 
various segments of society should not serve as an impediment for 
municipalities to ―become and remain attractive, viable 
communities providing good living and adequate services for all 
their residents in the kind of atmosphere which a democracy and 
free institutions demand.‖111  It is important to note that in order to 
actually realize such a result in the face of fair share obligations, 
the court pointed toward active government planning and 
cooperation.112  The court stopped short, in Mount Laurel I, of 
actually providing any clues of how governments can comply with 
such an obligation.113  Rather, the court vaguely pointed to a 
cooperative effort to achieve the desired goal of social equity—a 
reasonable affordance of housing opportunities for all economic 
classes of people.114 
Eight years later, in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey developed a template to clarify the broad directive of its 
earlier decision.115  Mount Laurel II arose as a result of substantial 
municipal noncompliance with the fair share doctrine previously 
discussed.116  Imposition of the fair share obligation, the court 
determined, should only affect those localities deemed to be ―growth 
areas‖ by the state‘s development plan.117  Through its reliance on 
 
subdivision is a logical place for development to occur, it must assume its rightful part of the 
burdens associated with development, neither isolating itself nor ignoring the housing needs 
of the larger region.‖ Id. (citations omitted).  Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm‘n of Town of 
Milford, 103 A.2d 814, 817 (Conn. 1954) (holding that approval of a subdivision cannot be 
denied on the basis that that subdivision will impose a financial burden on the town). 
110 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 733–34. 
111 Id. at 733. 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at 734. 
114 Id.  The court noted that a coalition of ―private builders, various kinds of associations, 
or, for public housing, by special agencies created for that purpose at various levels of 
government‖ should work together in furtherance of this objective.  Id. 
115 S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 413 (N.J. 1983) 
[hereinafter Mount Laurel II] (―Although [Mount Laurel I] set forth important guidelines for 
implementing the doctrine, their application to particular cases was complex, and the 
resolution of many questions left uncertain.‖). 
116 Id. at 410. 
117 See id. at 424 (making this determination in accord with public policy considerations).  
The court accepted the proposition that the state‘s development plan was an accurate 
reflection of where growth was expected to occur in the state.  Id. at 426.  The goal of this 
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the state development plan, the court sought to impose the fair 
share obligation in a manner consistent with the state‘s desires 
while avoiding irrational development.118  In seeking to resolve the 
great difficulty in calculating what fair share actually meant,119 the 
court suggested the creation of a judicial body that would serve as 
an administrative tribunal to determine and enforce the fair share 
obligation.120  It was intended that this body would, through the 
resolution of a few initial cases, establish a pattern that would 
create consistent expectations for each region, and the state as a 
whole.121  Further, a formula was suggested that would take into 
account a variety of factors when determining a locality‘s fair share 
obligation.122  The court suggested that affirmative measures such 
as subsidies and inclusionary zoning devices were necessary to 
effectuate the desired goal.123  Judicial remedies were also discussed 
in the event of a failure of a locality to meet its fair share 
obligations.124  While Mount Laurel I failed to produce concrete 
guidelines for achieving the fair share aspirations, Mount Laurel II 
succeeded—and was vilified as a result.125 
Following Mount Laurel II‘s directives, the New Jersey legislature 
enacted the Fair Housing Act126 that established an agency, as 
opposed to a judicial body,127 to determine regional housing needs 
and whether the fair share obligation was met.128  The agency, the 
 
determination was ―to channel the entire prospective lower income housing need in New 
Jersey into ‗growth areas.‘‖  Id. at 433. 
118 Id. at 435. 
119 Id. at 436 (noting that it was ―[t]he most troublesome issue‖ and ―takes the most time, 
produces the greatest variety of opinions, and engenders doubt as to the meaning and wisdom 
of [Mount Laurel I]‖). 
120 See id. at 438.  This judicial body consisted of three judges, each responsible for 
determining and enforcing the fair share obligation in a particular part of the state.  Id. at 
439. 
121 Id. at 439. 
122 Id. at 440–41 (suggesting that the regional factors (e.g., employment opportunities and 
other factors already employed in the state for determining water and sewer fair shares) 
should be given more weight than those pertaining to any particular municipality). 
123 See id. at 442–48 (commenting that governments should take a proactive approach in 
providing for affordable housing). 
124 See generally id. at 452–58 (suggesting that a builder‘s remedy, use of a special master, 
judicial revision of a town‘s zoning ordinance, and further judicial orders in the event that 
revised zoning still fails to satisfy the town‘s fair share obligation). 
125 John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable 
Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 22 (1987) (explaining that even ―the Governor of New 
Jersey equated Mount Laurel [II] with communism‖). 
126 DAVID J. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON LAND USE 551 (5th ed. 2008). 
127 See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 444. 
128 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301–52:27D-329 (West 2011) (establishing a 
statutory system in which low and moderate income housing planning is realized with respect 
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New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, in turn provides policies 
with respect to what local governments can do to create realistic 
housing opportunities as well as review demographic distribution 
plans submitted by municipalities.129  The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey addressed this statute‘s validity in light of their previous 
jurisprudence in what would come to be known as Mount Laurel 
III.130  In upholding the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act, 
the court noted that the legislation‘s effects were in line with its 
previous Mount Laurel rulings.131  Furthermore, the court expressed 
its preference for legislative rather than judicial resolution of the 
fair share question.132  However, complete judicial deference was not 
granted as the court exhibited a dedication to enforce the fair share 
obligation in the event the Fair Housing Act failed to do so.133  The 
presumption of the Act‘s constitutionality would only be overcome if 
it were almost certain to fail to achieve the Mount Laurel 
objectives.134  The court, thus, accepted the legislature‘s revision of 
the Mount Laurel II template. 
A reasonable opportunity for a variety of classes of people is not 
an unattainable summit.  The reasonableness limitation on a 
municipality‘s responsibilities helps to prevent situations in which 
 
to regional needs).  This legislation was passed only after the public outcry over Mount Laurel 
II abated.  See CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 126, at 551; Payne, supra note 14, 
at 367 (citing N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 52:27D-301–52:27D-329). 
129 Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An 
Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 
1271 (1997) (citing N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 52:27D-307 et seq.).  Political interests and, indeed, 
constraints have obfuscated the work of the Council and limited its achievements and overall 
effectiveness. Matthew Rao, Fair Share in Practice: The Council on Affordable Housing and 
the Mount Laurel Doctrine 26 (Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.planningpa.org/se_scholarships_fair_share.pdf. 
130 Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 631 (N.J. 1986) (citing Mount Laurel 
II, 456 A.2d 390, 439 (N.J. 1983); Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)). 
131 Hills Dev. Co., 510 A.2d at 640.  The court stated that the Fair Housing Act 
―addresse[d] the main needs delineated in our prior decisions on this matter, namely, the 
consistency on a statewide basis of the determination of regional need, fair share, and the 
adequacy of the municipal measures.‖  Id. 
132 Id. at 634 (holding that, until the legislature takes action, it is the duty of the courts to 
enforce the constitution). 
133 Id. at 633.  In a case determined in 2009 by a New Jersey court, it was held that even 
though a township not only met but exceeded their fair share of affordable housing, the 
township‘s land use planning board must nonetheless give requests for additional low income 
housing review and consideration of the fulfillment of certain variance criteria.  See Homes of 
Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128, 1128, 1131 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
134 Hills Dev. Co., 510 A.2d at 643 (―The judiciary must assume, if the assumption is at all 
reasonable, that the Act will function well and fully satisfy the Mount Laurel obligation.‖).  
See also supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text (discussing the fair share objectives of 
Mount Laurel I). 
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there is an underwhelming demand for affordable housing in a 
particular municipality.135  In examining the appropriate fate of the 
economic captive, the answer as to the correct path for 
municipalities in the aftermath of the Mount Laurel cases can also 
be extracted.  In fact, the solution of some combination of managed 
growth and bonus zoning in tandem with amortization provisions 
not only takes care of the economic captive, but also relieves the 
Mount Laurel albatross from the necks of municipalities.136  
Affordable housing is provided in accordance with a plan that will 
maximize the economic benefits to a locality; therefore, achieving a 
balance between opportunities for an economic captive and desired 
economic growth. 
V.  THE PLIGHT OF THE ECONOMIC CAPTIVE 
The economic captive, first recognized by Smith in 1995, is an 
individual who due to a limited economic status is forced to live in a 
particular area.137  The aspects of the location, which prompt the 
economic captive to call such a place home, share one common 
thread—economic necessity.138  Such exigencies include proximity to 
a place of employment, government-mandated rent-control, and 
cultural necessity, but this list is not exhaustive.139  In fact, all that 
is required for one to be considered an economic captive is that he 
must live in an area for socioeconomic reasons and have little choice 
in the matter due to financial, personal, or other social reasons.140  
The following discussion of examples of economic captives will 
highlight three possible classes of people upon whom this 
designation could be bestowed.  Understanding the nature of the 
economic captive‘s situation will enable a more complete analysis of 
 
135 Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 803 A.2d 53, 85 (N.J. 2002).  In expressing that a 
municipality need only provide affordable housing opportunities in relation to demand, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that ―developers are motivated by profit, and there is 
likely no greater area of concern for a developer than the marketability of its project.  The 
colloquial phrase ‗if you build it, they will come‘ does not translate well to the building of 
homes.‖ Id. 
136 See discussion infra Part V.B. and Part V.C.; cf. Katrin C. Rowan, Anti-Exclusionary 
Zoning in Pennsylvania: A Weapon for Developers, a Loss for Low-Income Pennsylvanians, 80 
TEMP. L. REV. 1271, 1304 (2007) (―By focusing on property rights rather than people and their 
need to live in decent, affordable housing, Pennsylvania‘s ‗fair share‘ case law removes the 
focus from low- and moderate-income Pennsylvanians and instead places power in the hands 
of developers, who generally do not have a profit incentive to build affordable housing.‖). 
137 Smith, supra note 4, at 706. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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what role the concept of economic captivity should have with respect 
to nuisance law. 
A.  Mr. and Mrs. Riedi Meet Wilhelmina: Elderly Exigencies 
The previously discussed case of Ann and Conrad Riedi provides 
but one example of economic captives.141  As observed, despite the 
fact that the elderly couple has lived in the same apartment for 
forty years, the Riedis are faced with the choice of having to relocate 
to allow for new subway construction.142  The Riedis are economic 
captives in the sense that, because of their limited resources, age, 
and government rent control policy, they are confined not only to 
that part of the city, but to that particular building.143  Their 
situation does not exist in isolation.  In the landmark takings case 
Kelo v. City of New London,144 a corollary may be found to the 
Riedis‘ situation.  One of the landowners who challenged the taking 
of her property in the name of economic redevelopment was 
Wilhelmina Dery, an elderly resident.145  Wilhelmina lived in her 
house for her entire life and her husband had lived there with her 
for roughly sixty years.146  As was the case with the Riedis, the only 
reason Wilhelmina was being forced to move was because her house 
stood in the way of a development project; blight was not an 
issue.147 
 
141 See Grynbaum, supra note 1. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New 
London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201, 203 (2006) (―[Kelo] is a 
case of reductio ad absurdum, meaning that its premise is flawed in that it deems almost 
everything to be a ‗public use.‘‖); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A 
Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751 (2009). 
145 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.  On June 24, 2010, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the New York State 
Urban Development Corporation had exercised—properly—its power of eminent domain on 
behalf of Columbia University‘s plan for a $6.3 billion expansion in West Harlem.  Kaur v. 
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E. 721 (N.Y. 2010).  A crucial seventeen acres of private 
property were blocking this expansion of the University, which would not only upgrade the 
―blighted‖ neighborhood by construction of a civic project which would be dedicated to 
research and expansion of laboratories, libraries, and student housing, but would also create 
some 6,000 permanent jobs which, in turn, would make contributions to a better society in 
biotechnology and in health research.  Id. at 724–26, 729.  The Appellate Division had 
determined previously, by a three-to-two decision, that the power of eminent domain had 
been ultra vires and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 729.  But see Alexander D. Racketa, Takings 
for Economic Development in New York: A Constitutional Slam Dunk?, 20 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL‘Y 191, 197 (2010).  Racketa questions the implicit recognition by the New York 
Court of Appeals of economic development as a valid public use under the eminent domain 
power of the state constitution and calls upon the Court to not only constrain the expansion of 
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The situations of Wilhelmina and the Riedis highlight a 
circumstance that will become more and more frequent with an 
ever-increasing elderly population in this country.148  Many of these 
people can be described as having a modest income.149  As such, this 
elderly segment of the population will have a severely limited choice 
in terms of where to live.  Proximity to medical care, government 
services, and safety are very real considerations that warrant the 
need for an elderly economic captive to reside in a certain area.150  
Once relocated to an area that meets these specific criteria, an 
elderly economic captive should not be forced to endure nuisance-
like conditions.151 
B.  An Economic Captive with Cultural Needs to Boot 
There may also be other social underpinnings, in addition to 
economic needs, that account for an economic captive‘s decision to 
live in a particular locale.  In Asian Americans For Equality v. Koch, 
a proposed development project in Manhattan would have displaced 
residents of New York City‘s Chinatown district.152  At the time of 
the case, New York City had the largest Chinese community in 
America.153  The area of the proposed redevelopment was described 
as a ―major housing resource for the relatively recent immigrant 
families, the future immigrant families, those families who came . . . 
 
this notion but to also define, with care, the boundaries of ―blight‖ in seeking its removal as 
advancement of a public purpose.  Id.  Generally, when a taking adds significant wealth to 
society, courts will sustain it as being valid.  Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public 
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 108 (1986).  Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas, in his 
dissent in Kelo, cited a South Carolina takings case, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, in support 
of his contention that when slums exist and are ―blighted,‖ nuisance law should be seen as 
controlling over an exercise of the eminent domain power.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519–20 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992)).  The power 
to abate a nuisance requires no compensation.  See id.  Arguably, blighted areas could be 
considered aesthetic nuisances.  See generally George P. Smith, II, Aesthetic Nuisance: 
Reeducating the Judiciary, 24 REAL EST. L.J. 26 (1995) (arguing for a new standard which 
courts should implicate when recognizing aesthetic nuisances). 
148 WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 813 (2005), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf (noting that the elderly 
population in the United States ―is projected to double between 2000 and 2030.‖). 
149 Id. at 101 (noting that the median income for a household in which the householder was 
75 or over was $29,280 in 2003).  Also, in 2003, 10.2% of the population over age 65 lived in 
poverty.  Id. 
150 See Ana Petrovic, The Elderly Facing Gentrification: Neglect, Invisibility, Entrapment, 
and Loss, 15 ELDER L.J. 533, 549–50 (2007). 
151 Id. at 542. 
152 Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
153 Id. at 953 (noting that the city was expected to receive another 150,000 to 200,000 
Chinese immigrants by 1980). 
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long ago, but remain at the bottom of the economic ladder, and a 
small group of middle-income professionals and business 
persons.‖154  Also, many residents of this area fell below the poverty 
line.155  In addition to the economic necessity of living in this area, 
there were also important cultural reasons that made it almost 
imperative for these qualified economic captives to live in 
Chinatown.  Residing in this particular neighborhood was 
instrumental in the assimilation process for Chinese immigrants 
and there were employment opportunities in Chinese-owned 
business that were in close proximity to the economic captives‘ 
homes.156 
The case of an economically-dependent person, with additional 
cultural needs that bind him to a particular area of residence, adds 
another complication to the plight of the economic captive.  If some 
weight is to be given to one‘s economic situation when analyzing the 
viability of a ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense, should cultural 
exigencies factor into the analysis as well?  There is actually an 
economic efficiency argument that weighs in favor of consideration 
of an economic captive‘s cultural needs.157  That argument holds 
that the quicker an immigrant population assimilates into United 
States society, the sooner that population can contribute to the 
economy and do so at a more productive rate than would result if 
assimilation took longer.158  The socioeconomic implications that 
attach to the economic captive who is also an immigrant warrant 
consideration in the nuisance calculus.  A denial of its operative 
validity would result in both social and economic disharmonies. 
C.  Learning Lessons of Hardship: The Collegiate Economic Captive 
The example of a college student as an economic captive was first 
expressed in the initial pronouncement of the theory.159  Under such 
an example, a college student without the means to afford 
university housing must live in off-campus residences in order to 
 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (noting that the percentage of immigrants with socioeconomic restraints ranged 
from twenty to thirty-three percent of the population). 
156 Id.  A study of the area concluded that ―[p]roblems of assimilation for new immigrants 
are minimized by the absence of language and cultural barriers and the opportunities for 
employment from Chinese-owned businesses within walking distance from their homes.‖  Id. 
157 Cf. POSNER, supra note 13, at 715 (explaining that society‘s end-game should be wealth 
maximization). 
158 See Asian Ams., 514 N.Y.S.2d at 953–54. 
159 See Smith, supra note 4, at 706. 
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pursue the furtherance of their education.160  However, the off-
campus housing could very well be ―in a very poor, dilapidated 
housing unit in the inner city that is, however, within walking 
distance of the campus.‖161  The question becomes whether this 
economic captive with a collegiate permutation has any standing to 
bring a nuisance action against the conditions that their status, as a 
student of a particular university, theoretically required them to 
move to.  In such a case, the defendant may argue, and a court may 
consider as a factor, that the economic captive came to the nuisance.  
Once again, an economic justification can be found for affording this 
economic captive some recourse against the ―coming to the 
nuisance‖ defense they would surely face.  While post-secondary 
education has a plethora of social values, it also furthers economic 
utility through the creation of a more intelligent and skilled 
workforce that breeds entrepreneurism.162  Given the utility of 
college attendance, it would be counterproductive to discourage the 
pursuit of higher education by ignoring a student‘s status as an 
economic captive when sorting through the nuisance calculus. 
VI.  SOLUTIONS: EFFICACIES AND FLAWS 
A.  The Federal Approach: The Uniform Relocation Act 
In the event that an individual‘s property is taken for some 
government initiative—consistent with Fifth Amendment powers—
―just compensation‖ is required.163  The federal government has 
provided its own mechanism for the compilation of just 
compensation for people who are displaced as a result of a federal 
agency‘s taking of their property.164  In such an event of a taking, 
the taking agency is required to pay the ―actual reasonable 
expenses in moving [the displaced person], his family, business, 
farm operation, or other personal property.‖165  The displaced person 
 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 See Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress’s Power to Authorize the 
States to Implement Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L. REV. 903, 952 (1992). 
163 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
164 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and 
Federally Assisted Programs (Uniform Relocation Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–55 (2011). 
165 Id. § 4622(a)(1).  For the purposes of the federal solution, ―displaced person‖ refers to: 
(i) any person who moves from real property, or moves his personal property from real 
property— 
(I) as a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of 
such  real property in whole or in part for a program or project undertaken by a 
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should be relocated into a comparable living situation.166  The 
justification behind such a federally-funded relocation assistance 
program is founded in concerns with equity and fairness.167  This 
relocation legislation was intended ―to minimize the hardship of 
displacement on such persons.‖168  Additional compensation is 
afforded for any additional reasonable costs of relocation ―not in 
excess of $22,500.‖169  Replacement housing costs for displaced 
tenants are also considered in the federal statute.170 
The federal approach to dealing with the relocation of displaced 
persons as a result of a government taking does have an admirable 
purpose that seemingly falls in line with the underlying notion of 
fairness that is required of governments.171  This approach is 
founded on the notion that the displaced person is being put in a 
 
Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance. 
Id. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I). 
166 See id. § 4623. ―Comparable replacement dwelling‖ is statutorily defined as: 
[A]ny dwelling that is (A) decent, safe, and sanitary; (B) adequate in size to accommodate 
the occupants; (C) within the financial means of the displaced person; (D) functionally 
equivalent; (E) in an area not subject to unreasonable adverse environmental conditions; 
and (F) in a location generally not less desirable than the location of the displaced 
person‘s dwelling with respect to public utilities, facilities, services, and the displaced 
person‘s place of employment. 
Id. § 4601(10). 
167 Id. § 4621(b). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. § 4623(a)(1).  Additional reasonable costs could include title searches, recording fees, 
closing costs, and any debt service costs.  Id. § 4623(a)(1)(C). 
170 See id. § 4624. For tenants, the additional reasonable relocation expense provision 
covers amounts not in excess of $5,250.  Id. § 4624(a). 
171 See discussion supra Part IV.  In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that a community could be condemned in order to allow the 
General Motors Corporation to build a factory.  Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459–60 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  Even though the condemnation meant some 1,300 homes, 140 
businesses, six churches and one hospital were demolished, the court reasoned that eminent 
domain seizures of this nature served only to safeguard the common good by revitalizing, and 
thus sustaining, the economic foundations of the municipality and the state as well.  Id.  The 
same state supreme court ruled on July 30, 2004, that the Poletown precedent was to be 
discarded.  Accordingly, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the court held that economic 
development was an insufficient reason for justifying the condemnation of private property.  
Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783, 787 (Mich. 2004).  Interestingly, Hathcock 
does not support complete private to private condemnations.  See Ilya Somin, Overcoming 
Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of 
Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1027–28 (2004).  Indeed, Hathcock recognizes three 
exceptions to the ban on private-to-private transfers and compounds uncertainty in its 
application of failing to explain adequately how these three tests are to be employed 
prospectively.  See James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 859, 863–64 (2004).  The Michigan Supreme Court permits transfers to private parties if 
(i) the public retains control over the property, (ii) the condemnation was for a public 
necessity, or (iii) the condemnation was for a purpose separate from the transfer to the 
private party, such as blight removal.  Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d at 781–83. 
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comparable housing situation and that the compensation for such 
relocation is just.  Similarities exist between this approach and the 
compensated injunction of Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb 
Development Co.172  As is the case with a compensated injunction, 
the federal government is seeking to provide for the mitigation of 
harm to virtually innocent landowners while at the same time 
acknowledging a higher use of the property is in society‘s best 
interest and should be allowed to displace the current use.173  The 
burden of compensation is placed on the invading party, in this 
case, the government.  Furthermore, compensation of reasonable 
additional expenses is a valiant attempt to impose no further 
displacement costs on the person being forced to relocate.  
Ultimately, the most redeeming quality of the federal relocation 
assistance program is that it seeks to achieve a compromise 
between competing interests.174  Implicit in the statute is the 
recognition that there are certain governmental needs the 
fulfillments of which are highly beneficial to society.  At the same 
time, an attempt is made to make the relocated persons whole at 
the conclusion of the ordeal by trying to minimize the difference 
between the old residence and the one relocated to. 
Admirable as these goals may be, there are inherent flaws in the 
federal approach that make it untenable with respect to the 
economic captive.  While an attempt is made to relocate the 
displaced person to a place of comparable characteristics, such 
action may be impracticable for the economic captive.  Consider the 
 
172 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).  See discussion 
supra Part II.B.2.  There are also similarities with efforts to rebuild localities after they have 
been decimated by a natural disaster.  See Terry L. Clower, Economic Applications in 
Disaster Research, Mitigation, and Planning 6 (on file with Albany Law Review) (noting 
―surprisingly liberal attitudes . . . toward[] disaster relief.‖).  However, many disfavor 
rebuilding disaster areas with taxpayer dollars.  See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, IRC 
Study Finds Strong Support for Government Policies to Mitigate Damage from Natural 
Disasters Before They Happen But Also Finds Lack of Personal Preparation 2, Aug. 31, 2006, 
http://208.84.250.9/irc/news/20060831.pdf (showing that roughly sixty percent of people do not 
support using tax dollars to subsidize disaster insurance).  It may be better to compensate 
displaced people for their losses instead of rebuilding their homes in the same high-risk area.  
In fact, ―the usual lesson from economics is that people are better off if they are given money 
and allowed to make their own decisions, much as they are with car insurance.‖  Edward L. 
Glaeser, Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans, Or Just Give Residents Checks?, 2 
THE ECONOMISTS‘ VOICE 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss4/art4.  
The underlying consideration for such an approach is a cost-benefit analysis which shows that 
rebuilding homes destroyed by natural disasters is too costly a proposition.  Id. at 5. 
173 See discussion supra Part III. 
174 The utility of such a goal can be witnessed through the discussion of the undeniable 
need for the employment of a balancing test in nuisance actions.  See discussion supra Part 
II.A. 
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case of the Riedis‘ as an archetypical situation that thwarts the 
purpose of the statute.  The federal government sought to 
implement the provisions of the aforementioned statute to facilitate 
the Riedis‘ move to another locale, in order to make way for a 
Manhattan subway development.175  The government-sponsored 
real estate agent charged with facilitating the move to comparable 
housing suggested that the couple relocate to an area of Manhattan 
that faces a busy intersection at the entrance to a bridge.176  This 
relocation alternative proved to be untenable for people in the 
Riedis‘ situation as the busy intersection is unsafe for the elderly.177  
The only other alternative suggested to them, based on their 
housing needs, financial situation, and the scarcity of housing in 
Manhattan, was to move out of Manhattan and into another 
borough of the city.178  The Riedis‘ situation belies a major failing of 
the federal approach with respect to economic captives—the unique 
socioeconomic position of the economic captive may make finding 
comparable housing alternatives within close proximity to their 
former residence impossible.  This may move the economic captive 
outside of the small radius that their unique socio-economic status 
requires them to reside in.  The aftermath of such a move could very 
likely feature an increasing incompatibility of uses of land if the 
economic captive is moved to an area ill-suited for their needs.179  
Refusing to weigh the economic captive‘s socioeconomic situation 
against the ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense in resulting nuisance 
actions would create an inequitable exacerbation of a status quo in 
which the economic captive becomes an increasingly marginalized 
member of society.  In order to give acknowledgment that economic 
captives should be included in societal considerations, legal 
significance must be given to their socioeconomic status. 
B.  Local Government Responses 
1.  The District of Columbia 
A dramatic, contemporary illustration of economic captivity—and 
a laudable effort, by the government, to deal with the pernicious 
effects of it—is found in the distribution of federal stimulus 
 
175 Grynbaum, supra note 1, at A17. 
176 Id. at A20. 
177 Id. (discussing the Riedis‘ refusal to relocate to this proposed location). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at A17, A20 (explaining that in the relocation search, the government‘s idea of 
equivalent housing is not the same as the residents‘ idea of equivalent housing). 
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(―TARP‖) monies.180  Specifically, in December 2009, approximately 
$7.5 million dollars from the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development‘s ―Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-
Housing‖ Program was given to the District of Columbia 
government.181 
This disbursement was designated to assist families—for up to 
eighteen months—with subsidy payments for property rental 
arrangements and payment of utility bills past due.182  Designed as 
―a new tool that allows the city to help low-income people [e.g., 
captives], who would otherwise become homeless,‖183 the program 
recognizes and, in a very real way, validates the theory of economic 
captivity.  Impoverished individuals are essentially provided with 
an economic incentive, in the form of grant monies, to remain in 
their housing units and thereby, ideally, stabilize and improve their 
neighborhoods and forestall homelessness.184  As well, by these 
grants, the government is recognizing that it has a responsibility to 
maintain a standard of living—albeit meager to be sure—for those 
unfortunate citizens who do not have the economic freedom to seek 
better housing and are thus relegated to the status of economic 
captives. 
2.  New York City 
As a consequence of the popularity of suburbanization, which 
reached its zenith at the end of World War II, major U.S. cities lost 
a significant amount of their populations and soon became 
concentrated heavily with the urban poor.185  Even with current 
efforts to promote new forms of revitalized urbanization through 
―Smart Growth‖ policies, the expenses of poverty in the inner cities 
of America remain a significant, if not staggering, concern to 
municipal governments.186  Indeed, redistributing clusters of 
 
180 TARP is an acronym for the ―Troubled Assets Relief Program.‖  See Gary Lawson, 
Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 55, 57 (2010).  
181 Darryl Fears, $7.5 Million to Keep a Roof Over Their Heads, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2009, 
at B10.  But see Lawson, supra note 180.  Lawson argues that the President‘s executive 
powers do not constitutionally include a power to take any course of action that the executive 
thinks is important for the country, regardless of congressional inactions or lack of statutory 
basis.  Id. 
182 Id. See Debbie Cenziper, infra note 191. 
183 Fears, supra note 181, at B10. 
184 Id.  See discussion infra Part VI.D. (discussing grandfathering and amortization as 
methods to confront the plight of the economic captive). 
185 Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Redistribution of 
Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 9–10 (1995). 
186 Id. 
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poverty regionally and out of the inner city cores has become, since 
Mount Laurel I was decided in New Jersey in 1975,187 a national 
fixation.188 
In 1979, New York City owned some 8,950 buildings which 
provided 110,000 housing units.189  In 2010, the city owned 
approximately 190 buildings.190  During the period of time from 
1979 to 2010, the city sought—by divesture—to take 100,000 
slumlord units and convert them into 100,000 rehabilitated ones, 
which in turn, served as catalysts for redevelopment of ten 
neighborhoods throughout the city.191  Approximately 442 of the 
rehabilitated buildings are delinquent in their payment of 
municipal tax assessments and utilities.192  A total debt of $140 
million is owed, collectively, on these buildings—with nearly half of 
this amount being levied on a per unit debt of $3,000.193 
Clustered principally in Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, the South 
Bronx, and Harlem, these originally rehabilitated buildings are now 
populated by poor residents and are owned either by private or non-
profit associations overseeing building management.194  Because of 
this socioeconomic demographic in occupancy level, the building 
owners have ―razor-thin margins to operate on.‖195  This situation is 
 
187 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
188 See Poindexter, supra note 185, at 37–38.  It has been suggested, however, that a 
contemporary model for municipal growth relies upon a central assumption, namely, ―that a 
city‘s economic development is really a competition for mobile taxpayers.‖  Richard C. 
Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 311, 338 (2010).  Accordingly, a city should not develop policies that are concerned 
exclusively with the well being of current residents.   
189 Cara Buckley, Rescued from Blight, Falling Back Into Decay, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2010, 
at A18. 
190 Id. 
191 Id.  The practical difficulties confronting other large American cities—such as 
Charlotte, North Carolina—in finding affordable housing through housing rental units and 
houses for the poor, are often compounded by issues of financial mismanagement of Home 
Fund grant monies from the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD)—a fund set aside purposely for low income assistance housing.  This conduct, in turn, 
has resulted in significant loss of expected housing opportunities for the poor which will now 
be exacerbated by recent Congressional budget cuts to HUD.  Debbie Cenziper, Amid Need, A 
Push to Review Projects, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2011, at 1.  See also Michael Cooper, Tough 
Choice for Cities as Federal Aid Shrinks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at A19 (highlighting the 
plight of Allentown, Pennsylvania).  
192 Buckly, supra note 189 at A15. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id.  See also Mary Marsh Zulack, If You Prompt Them, They Will Rule: The Warranty of 
Habitability Meets New Court Information Systems, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 425, 429 (2007) 
(suggesting a new judicial supervisory approach for revitalizing the implied warranty of 
habitability which would thereby serve as a catalyst for accelerating repairs of rental housing 
and thereby make them more habitable).  But see THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, 
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complicated further by the fact that, to protest against what have 
become substandard living conditions in these once rehabilitated 
buildings, many of the tenants-captives have simply stopped paying 
their monthly rents.196  The City plans to protect these low-income 
tenants by foreclosing on approximately ten of these distressed 
properties.197  The tenants would be protected under these forced 
sales because all pre-existing municipal regulations, such as rent 
stabilization, would continue.198 
C.  Subjectivity in Determining Just Compensation 
Currently, just compensation for the taking of one‘s property 
through eminent domain is the fair market value of that 
property.199  However, this approach has been criticized for its 
rigidity and the inequitable consequences imposed on the 
homeowner.200  Compensating someone only through payment of the 
 
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 728, 732–35 (2007).  Only four states have failed to 
recognize an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies and Professor Merrill 
and Professor Smith acknowledge the continuing debate regarding whether a mandated 
implied warranty of habitability improves the welfare of low-income tenants or whether it is 
negligible.  Id.  Yet, when a tenant ―changes the condition‖ of property, waste is committed. 
Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and The Doctrine of Waste in American 
Property Law, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 1055, 1091 (2011).  Posner cautions, however, that not every 
change in the condition of property may be classified as waste.  POSNER, supra note 13, § 3.11. 
196 Buckley, supra note 191, at A18. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 See James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be Moved”: Urban Communities, Eminent 
Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 923, 939 (2006) 
(criticizing the fair market value approach ―as the quite limiting default rule for 
constitutionally mandated compensation.‖).  In order to protect against excessive uses of their 
taking powers, government entities should be held to some form of heightened scrutiny under 
the Due Process Clause—possibly by use of pre-condemnation hearings.  D. Zachary Hudson, 
Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 1306–11, 1320–21 (2010).  However, this 
approach is problematic because the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to fully define the legal 
rights of property owners facing eminent domain actions by local, state, or federal authorities.  
Id. at 1286.  Under the Supreme Court‘s 1985 holding in Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, in order for a property owner to pursue 
compensation under a Fifth Amendment takings claim in the federal courts, he must first 
pursue his claim for compensation through state procedures.  Williamson Cnty. Reg‘l 
Planning Comm‘n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985).  In order to expedite claims of 
this nature, it has been urged that the ―federal courts [should] resume their obligation to 
adjudicate property rights claims.‖  J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of 
Williamson County’s Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-
Takings Claims, 41 URB. LAW. 615, 651 (2009).  Another approach to limiting the abuse of 
eminent domain powers would be the revival of the necessity doctrine which holds the 
necessity or expediency of a taking under eminent domain powers is a legislative 
determination and not subject to judicial review.  Robert C. Bird, Reviving Necessity in 
Eminent Domain, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 239, 243, 256 (2010). 
200 John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 
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fair market value of the property taken fails to take into account 
any amount of subjective value that a particular homeowner has 
attached to the land.201  The fair market value approach, it has been 
argued, ―fail[s] to differentiate between what money could buy and 
what it could not buy.‖202  One suggestion has been to compensate 
the homeowner an additional percentage of the fair market value 
based on how long they have lived in a home.203  Another approach 
would be to undertake an objective consideration of what amount 
would need to be paid to the homeowner in order to make them feel 
―whole.‖204 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to make a conclusion as 
to the appropriate method of just compensation, it is worth noting 
that there is considerable debate on this issue.205  Understanding 
the fact that it is still unresolved in terms of what role subjectivity 
should play in the calculation of just compensation provides the 
necessary gloss for the inquiry into the compensatory efficacy of a 
method for dealing with relocation in lieu of eminent domain 
proceedings.  Given this discussion, another shortcoming of the 
Uniform Relocation Act is that it lacks any recognition of the 
subjective values attached by homeowners to their homes.206  The 
fact that the Riedis have lived in their apartment for over forty 
years has no bearing on how much they are to be compensated.207  
Thus, the failure of the federal approach to provide for sentimental 
and other subjective attachments that the economic captive may 
have to their home amounts to another criticism of the program. 
 
790 (2006) (―Because just compensation law generally undervalues the home, it does not 
adequately deter government from using eminent domain against homes.‖). 
201 Id. at 790–91. 
202 Kelly, supra note 199, at 989. 
203 See Fee, supra note 200, at 818 (providing a model statute in which a ―personal 
detachment award‖ is calculated based on how long a person has lived in the house, allowing 
for greater compensation the longer one has lived in a house). 
204 Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
239, 274 (2007) (relying on ―the considered judgments of others about what makes a person 
whole.‖). 
205 CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 128, at 305–06.  The current fair market 
value method of compensation does not take subjective values into account, but that some 
states provide for compensation to include more than 100% of the fair market value of the 
property.  Id.  The debate over just compensation has intensified in the wake of expanding 
notions regarding the public use.  Id. at 305. 
206 See Grynbaum, supra note 1, at A20. 
207 Id. at A17.  Ann Riedi best expressed this concern when she said, ―‗[h]ow do you take 
the memories?‘‖  Id. at A20. 
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D.  Managed Growth and Bonus Zoning 
Managed growth is a mechanism through which local 
governments seek to effectuate a greater quality of life and 
sustainability through the harmonious commingling of residential, 
commercial, and conservative goals.208  Maryland‘s ―Smart Growth‖ 
initiative embodies the principles and values that are accomplished 
in an ideal implementation of managed growth.209  Under such an 
initiative, communities should be designed in a ―compact, mixed-
use, walkable design consistent with existing community character 
and located near available or planned transit options.‖210  Further, 
specific attention is given to transportation211 and the provision of 
housing to people of mixed ages and incomes.212  At the heart of 
managed growth is a desire to maximize the economic development 
of localities.213  A managed or ―smart‖ design for population and 
business distribution would provide ―employment opportunities for 
all income levels within the capacity of the State‘s natural 
resources, public services, and public facilities.‖214 
Though many municipal layouts are already entrenched, bonus 
zoning will allow the government to reshape the area over time to 
achieve the desired layout consistent with the goals of managed 
growth.215  Under such an approach, the municipality, in exchange 
for granting a permit to a developer, could require certain actions on 
the part of the developer for the betterment of the community at 
large.216  While such an approach has been viewed with disfavor in 
some states, many others view this type of agreement favorably 
because ―it provides flexibility to deal with unanticipated 
problems.‖217  Massachusetts, for example, has found ―that the 
 
208 MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1.01(1) (LexisNexis 2011). 
209 See id.; but see Lisa Rein, Study Calls Md. Smart Growth a Flop, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2009, at B1 (regarding claims that Maryland‘s smart growth has largely been unsuccessful 
―because it has no teeth to force local governments to comply and because builders have little 
incentive to redevelop older urban neighborhoods‖). 
210 LAND USE § 1.01(4).  This type of community design is intended to be an efficient 
utilization of local resources while maintaining a consistency with the locale‘s socioeconomic 
and natural character.  Id. 
211 Id. § 1.01(6) (citing the goal of creating ―a well-maintained, multimodal transportation 
system [that] facilitates the safe, convenient, affordable, and efficient movement of people‖). 
212 Id. § 1.01(7). 
213 See id. § 1.01. 
214 Id. § 1.01(8). 
215 See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261–b (McKinney 2011). 
216 JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
CONTROL LAW 195 (1998). 
217 Id. at 196. 
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voluntary offer of public benefits beyond what might be necessary to 
mitigate the development of a parcel of land does not, standing 
alone, invalidate a legislative act.‖218  The merits of bonus zoning lie 
in the flexibility and collaborative nature inherent in its utilization. 
The implementation of managed growth intermingled with bonus 
zoning should be very seriously considered—especially with respect 
to dealing with the issue of economic captivity.  Instituting an early 
plan with respect to population distribution—as is the goal of 
managed growth219—could be very effective in limiting the 
imposition of hardship on the economic captive.  This foresight can 
be seen as a pre-litigation bargain in which transactional costs are 
minimized.220  This ―Coasean‖ efficiency benefits society by 
preempting costly litigation in light of government efforts to 
confront the reality of economic captivity from an early stage.221 
Additionally, through bonus zoning, there can be some cost-shifting 
from the government onto private entities in which they receive 
favorable zoning in exchange for providing for appropriate facilities 
for the economic captive in accordance with the affordable housing 
mandates of the managed growth initiative.  Importantly, the end-
game of managed growth and bonus zoning is economic 
maximization.222  Managed growth achieves this end-game while 
also giving consideration to the ―fair share‖ requirement and 
notions of social justice.223 
Collaboration between public and private entities is inevitable 
under this system.224  However, such an approach, in isolation, is 
not without its shortcomings.  Managed growth may be 
impracticable in certain areas—most likely in places with very high 
 
218 Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Mass. 2003) (upholding an 
agreement between a municipality and a developer whereby the developer would provide $8 
million to the town‘s general fund in exchange for a rezoning favorable to the developer). 
219 See Jerome G. Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved 
Issues, 6 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 694, 698 (1975). 
220 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8, 13, 15–16 (1960). 
221 See id. at 17–18. 
222 See discussion supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra Part IV. (The court in Mount Laurel I, held that municipalities are required 
to provide affordable housing in proportion to their fair share of various demographic groups).  
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (1975). 
224 See Steven P. Frank, Yes in My Backyard: Developers, Government and Communities 
Working Together Through Development Agreements and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 
IND. L. REV. 227, 232–33 (2009) (noting that managed growth decision making involves direct 
negotiations between municipalities and developers); but cf.  Braham Boyce Ketcham, The 
Alexandrian Planning Process: An Alternative to Traditional Zoning and Smart Growth, 41 
URB. LAW. 339, 354 (2009) (commenting that managed growth, described as an imposition of 
―order from above,‖ is not guaranteed to feature cooperation as developers have to 
independently decide to invest in such a project). 
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preexisting population densities—where changing the population 
distribution would require such an overhaul of the current 
distribution that creation of a managed growth area is 
unrealistic.225  Further, little consideration is given to whatever 
subjective values the economic captives may have attached to their 
homes before they have been moved to the managed growth area.226  
Overall though, there is much to say about the efficacy of such a 
design, especially when addressing the question of what to do with 
the economic captive. 
E.  Utilizing Grandfathering and Amortization 
Grandfather clauses are legislative mechanisms whereby a 
temporary right to continue an activity is granted even though that 
activity has been deemed to be inappropriate in a given locale.227  
This proposition reinforces the notion that a landowner has a vested 
right to continue with a certain use of his land even after that use 
has been deemed non-conforming.228  Similar to a grandfather 
clause, an amortization provision allows for a now non-conforming 
use to be continued in an area where it was previously allowed.229  
Amortization, however, requires that the non-conforming use be 
eliminated within a specified period of time.230  The length of such a 
period is determined based on the nature of the use and the 
economic-backed expectations of the landowner.231  The goal is to 
strike a balance between ―the relative importance to be given to the 
public gain and to the private loss.‖232  The fulcrum of this balancing 
test must be economic considerations. 
The options that these two mechanisms provide with respect to 
economic captives are to either grandfather in economic captives so 
that they cannot be forced to leave their property for the duration of 
their lifetime, or alternatively provide for an amortization grace 
period of substantially reasonable length of time so as to mitigate 
the harm to the economic captive.  In order to effectuate the 
 
225 Rein, supra note 209, at B1 (citing a study saying that ―smart growth has not made a 
dent in Maryland‘s war on sprawl.‖). 
226 See supra Part VI (examining the debate over what is just compensation). 
227 See Wisc. Wine & Spirit Inst. v. Ley, 416 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that a grandfather clause is valid so long as it has a rational basis). 
228 Whaley v. Dorchester Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 524 S.E.2d 404, 410 (S.C. 1999) 
(Toal, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
229 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 216, at 158. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 158–59. 
232 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954). 
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economic progression of society,233 an amortization period makes 
more sense as it creates a firm deadline for when the economic 
captives must relocate.  Predictability is achieved.  Amortization 
also serves as an acknowledgment that some credence should be 
given to the subject values attached to the home.234  Allowing for 
economic captives to remain in their homes for a certain period of 
time allows for a transition period, which lessens the harshness of 
forcing them to leave their home.  One potential setback of such an 
approach is that the rigidity of an amortization period—the 
inability to remove a non-conforming use for an expressed period of 
time—could stunt economic growth and prevent the achievement of 
a municipality‘s maximum potential.  This concern is relieved by 
the determination of the reasonableness of the amortization period.  
Balancing the public versus private considerations will yield an 
amortization period that will neither severely hinder the needs of 
the locality nor impose too harsh of a burden on the economic 
captive as the reasonable period of time still provides for the 
achievement of the locality‘s goals while providing economic 
captives with adequate time to adapt and relocate.  As a 
complement to managed growth and bonus zoning, the utilization of 
an amortization period provides the necessary buffer for the 
implementation of a system whereby economic maximization is 
achieved without marginalizing the economic captive. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
That there are low-income people in modern society is a 
socioeconomic reality that cannot be avoided.235  As a member of 
this segment of society, an individual is essentially required to live 
in a certain area due to geographic proximity to employment 
opportunities and the availability of affordable housing, among 
other reasons.236  To date, this status provides no added legal 
significance with respect to nuisance law.  When an economic 
captive is forced to relocate to an area where he is then subjected to 
a nuisance-like activity as a result of either eminent domain 
 
233 See supra Part II.A. (explaining that the desired goal of the law is to further the 
economic advancement of society). 
234 See discussion supra Part VI. 
235 See Fernandez, supra note 9, at A26.  Of the hundreds of thousands of people living in 
public housing, many have to endure ―crime, poverty, vandalism and poor maintenance [that] 
contribute[s] to a sense of decay or indifference.‖  Id. 
236 See generally, supra Part VI (commenting that economic captives are forced to live in 
certain areas based on the necessities their socioeconomic status imposes upon them). 
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proceedings or socioeconomic necessity, his status does not 
currently factor into the traditional nuisance calculus.  Although 
―coming to the nuisance‖ is not a per se bar against a nuisance 
claim, it is a factor that can weigh against an economic captive 
plaintiff.  As such, weight should also be given to the fact that the 
plaintiff is an economic captive with limited housing choices. 
An examination into the efficacy of a variety of approaches with 
respect to what to do with the economic captive in the event that 
they are displaced leads to the conclusion that the economic captive 
status should be given consideration as part of the requisite 
balancing test of nuisance actions.237  Employing the principles of 
managed growth238 and bonus zoning,239 with an assist from the 
utilization of amortization periods,240 proves to be the most 
efficacious means by which to relocate economic captives and 
thereby recognize their legal statuses as such, while minimizing 
potential conflicts in the form of nuisance actions as they will be 
relocated to areas in which their presence is compatible with the 
overall layout of the area.  Managed growth provides affordable 
housing for the economic captive in a planned location, with close 
proximity to sufficient transportation and employment 
opportunities.  Bonus zoning puts the burden on municipalities to 
bear the entire cost of creating these new managed communities.  
Furthermore, amortization periods allow for a transition period for 
the economic captives to be relocated while also acknowledging that 
some subjective value should be attached to one‘s home. 
This proposed method for relocating the economic captive into a 
more desirable location seeks to minimize the number of nuisance 
actions brought by the economic captive, thereby minimizing 
transaction costs.241  By making way for a transition of the economic 
captive into a more desirable location, which would reduce the 
amount of nuisance-like activity that the economic captive would be 
subjected to, there is an implicit acknowledgment that attention 
should be given to one‘s status as an economic captive.  Because the 
fact that a plaintiff has come to the alleged nuisance is but one 
 
237 Supra Part II.A. (explaining that in a nuisance action, it is the duty of the courts to 
balance the utility of the good versus the gravity of the harm in order to resolve the dispute).  
Economics serves as the inherent fulcrum upon which the balance of two competing uses 
should be placed.  Smith, supra note 4, at 699; MANDLKER, supra note 6, § 4.12. 
238 See supra Part VI.D. 
239 See supra Part VI.D. 
240 See supra Part VI.E. 
241 Coase, supra note 220 (noting that such a position is optimal for society and will best 
serve the common good). 
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factor that is considered in the modern ad hoc nuisance inquiry,242 
the possibility that weight will be given to economic captivity status 
is not foreclosed.  The economic utility of the managed growth 
amalgamation reinforces the position that a plaintiff required to live 
in a certain location as a result of their socioeconomic status should 
be taken into consideration as a counter to the ―coming to the 
nuisance‖ defense.  Accordingly, this will reduce the transactional 
costs of nuisance actions while providing for an equitable relocation 
of economic captives that will satisfy their needs. 
Socioeconomic status is unquestionably a factor if indeed not a 
decisive determinant, in choosing a place to live.  As shown, those 
with limited financial reserves and low income are usually 
restricted to housing opportunities which are often deficient in 
public services and are located in unsafe and unsanitary 
neighborhoods where standards of habitability are severely lower if 
not jeopardized entirely.243  The social costs expended in either 
maintaining sub-standard housing units in blighted communities or 
relocating inhabitants in these neighborhoods to better 
accommodations are staggering.244 
In situations, for example, where neither municipal, state nor 
federal relocations are feasible economically, the ―captive‖ residents 
in these substandard living accommodations should not be seen as 
waiving their legal rights to unreasonable interferences with their 
use and enjoyment of their real property interests.  In truth, they 
have been forced to come to the nuisance(s) as economic captives.  A 
common or basic sense of decency and humanity should impose a 
legally enforceable responsibility to provide services that are 
deemed necessary for an acceptable standard of living or 
habitation.245 
Rather than continue to abuse eminent domain powers and 
condemn ―blighted‖ sub-standard housing (developments) or 
neighborhoods in order to promote economic development, it would 
be more equitable to rehabilitate the areas, as both the District of 
Columbia246 and New York City247 are doing and, thereby, 
revalidate the law of nuisance; for, ―the power to abate a nuisance, 
 
242 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1987). 
243 See Zulack, supra note 197; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 195. 
244 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Lawson, supra note 180; Schragger, 
supra note 188; Poindexter, supra note 185; Buckley, supra note 189; Fears, supra note 181. 
245 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 195. 
246 See Lawson, supra note 180; Fears, supra note 181. 
247 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 713; Schragger, supra note 188; Poindexter, supra note 
185; Zulack, supra note 195; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 195; Buckley, supra note 189. 
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require[s] no compensation.‖248  In today‘s society, there is, most 
assuredly, a place for a theory of economic captivity to be recognized 
within the law of nuisance.  Acceptance of this theory of necessity, 
assures a re-conceptualization—and thus allows for a 
reinterpretation—of the undergirding economic policies that drive 
the whole of economic jurisprudence and thus impact directly 
nuisance law.  Acknowledging that this theory of economic captivity 
is not only efficacious but normative and sound economically, will 
prompt—hopefully—a new consideration if not a direct effort, which 
will seek to balance efficiency and wealth maximization with (social) 
fairness and not treat these values as antithetical vectors of force.249 
 
 
248 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 519 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
249 See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 31. 
